Q&A: Dinshaw Mistry Discusses His Latest Work

Containing Missile Proliferation

, the latest work by Dinshaw Mistry, assistant professor of political science and director of Asian studies, could not have had a more timely publication date.

Perspectives on Political Science

describes Mistry's exhaustive evaluation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as “the most comprehensive analysis of the missile nonproliferation regime.”

Q:

Given the accolades you and the book have received, you're especially well qualified to assess the state of missile technology in places we hear so much about. What are your thoughts about how far advanced North Korea and Iran are?

A:

North Korea and Iran have strategic weapons programs that are far too advanced to be halted by technology denial. They can be halted only by a sustained diplomatic effort or a devastating military conflict. This, in fact, was a major conclusion of the book-technology control regimes can delay target weapons programs, but such regimes are undermined over time.

Q:

Is one country a greater threat than the other? What are the differences we face in dealing with each?

A:

North Korea is more of a threat primarily because it already has nuclear weapons, while Iran does not. Yet Iran has better economic and technological capabilities than North Korea. In the middle-term, it could develop a stronger nuclear program.

Q:

What other nations most concern you? Why?

A:

Concerns change every few years. Kennedy and Khruschev were concerned about France and China. The next set of concerns was Japan, Germany, Sweden, and Switzerland, and then came Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, and some former Soviet republics. All are now contained under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. More recently, Pakistan, Israel, and India have been concerns. These states, as well as China, France, Britain, Russia, and the United States, are today's nuclear powers. It is hard to see how nuclear proliferation can be contained over the long term without real restraint by the present nuclear powers. In the short term, rather than nations, non-national or terrorist groups are the most serious concern. Yet this threat can be managed-we can, within a few years, adequately secure the global inventory of nuclear material.

Q:

Do you think we will, in fact, ever be able to achieve full containment?

A:

Yes, with the necessary political will. The nonproliferation treaty establishes the foundations for such containment. The test ban treaty and a future fissile material treaty are vital next steps to containment. There is a clear international legal framework and institutional path to full containment; it just needs to be followed through.

Q:

Does doing research and writing about a subject with such serious implications present a special challenge?

A:

While challenging, it presents a unique opportunity. Most research on this topic is done by governmental agencies or non-governmental think-tanks, and there is relatively little academic scholarship on the issue. Yet rigorous and theoretically-informed scholarship provides unique insights that are neglected in non-academic treatments of the subject.